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Gobierno Corporativo - beBee

Gobierno Corporativo

~ 100 buzzes
“El GC abarca un conjunto de relaciones entre la administración de la empresa, su consejo de administración, sus accionistas y otras partes interesadas. Proporciona la estructura para fijar los objetivos de la compañía y los medios para alcanzar esos objetivos y supervisar el desempeño”.
- Principios de Gobierno Corporativo de la OECD, 2004.
Buzzes
  1. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Choosing among strategy options. Strategy approaches.
    joaquinbarquero.wordpress.com I have posted several comments on strategy before, (1), and a certain idea that all options seem reasonable arises, but of course, strategy cannot be drafted following ten different alternative...
    Relevant
  2. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, by Dorothy Shapiro Lund
    joaquinbarquero.wordpress.com The increase in the power of shareholders faces big challenges as regulation is not necessarily followed by a correct valuation of voting (the most powerful of their capacities), by them. The One...
    Relevant
  3. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Where Friedman Was Wrong -
    promarket.org A new paper by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales argues that a company’s objective should be the maximization of shareholders’ welfare, not value.      In 1970, Milton Friedman famously argued that corporate managers should “conduct the business in...
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    Comments

    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    27/07/2017 #1 JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    A good reading "Hart and Zingales criticize the divestment movement and favor an “invest and engage” approach, i.e., prosocial investors should engage and be vocal about corporate decisions, rather than shy away".:
  4. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Why do boards exist? The board as a team and its superiority.
    joaquinbarquero.wordpress.com The post follows an article by Stephen Bainbridge, William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law in Los Angeles, (1). A) The board statutory role. Boards are given by...
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  5. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Agency Costs and Institutional dominated share ownership: activists and governance
    joaquinbarquero.wordpress.com Summary: Institutional Investors (II) -such as mutual funds- are rational while not doing research and issuing shareholder proposals; activists and hedge funds may have a role issuing those...
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  6. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    The Classified Board Duels
    clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu Professor Lucian Bebchuk has engaged in two rounds of law-review-article duels with Professor Martijn Cremers and Professor Simone Sepe over classified boards. The weapons were statistics (and...
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  7. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Mutual Fund Advisors’ “Empty Voting” Raises New Governance Issues
    clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu The creation of the mutual fund will go down as one of the greatest innovations in financial history. It has provided tens if not hundreds of millions of unsophisticated and uninformed stock...
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  8. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Corporate ethics boost confidence in Spain | Ethical Boardroom
    ethicalboardroom.com By Ana María Martínez–Pina García - Vice Chairperson of the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV)             Ensuring corporate transparency and the smooth running of corporate boards, as well as fostering competitiveness, has been one of...
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  9. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Proxy Access in 2017: A Critique from the Director Primacy Perspective
    www.professorbainbridge.com Andrew Ledbetter, Louis Lehot, and Nicole Hatcher offer an analysis of proxy trends in 2017: In 2017 proxy access continues to be the hottest topic among shareholders in the annual meeting process, especially for Fortune 500 companies. We believe...
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  10. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    joaquinbarquero.wordpress.com In firms with concentrated structure, (be it because of the economic stake or as a result of multiple-share capital structures, or as a result of the retail shareholders´apathy), the fact that controlling shareholders can extract private benefits...
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  11. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    www.professorbainbridge.com Since 2003, the NYSE has required the boards of listed companies to conduct an annual self-evaluation.[i] Commentators have endorsed such evaluations as being a critical corporate governance best practice, arguing that no one—not managers,...
    Relevant
  12. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    The case for pruning the shareholder proposal regime
    www.professorbainbridge.com The usual suspects are quite worried: Shareholder Proposals Threatened by Financial Reform Bill the House Passedhttps://t.co/d704jUuihc pic.twitter.com/RmlZLLSGYV — Consumer Reports (@ConsumerReports) June 12, 2017 Me? Not so much. I made the case...
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  13. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Controlled Companies and Independent Directors
    joaquinbarquero.wordpress.com Lucien Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani have recently published an article, (1) in which they present an alternative to current director elections so that true independence is assured, in particular at...
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  14. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Corporate Governance and the Sharing Economy
    joaquinbarquero.wordpress.com In a world of robots interacting with humans and learning out of the process, while connected with all other robots in a network; in a world of artificial intelligence, disruptive technologies and...
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  15. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Do Investors Follow Directors to Other Companies?
    clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu In our recent study, we find that institutional investors follow high-performing directors to new firms and make larger initial investments in those firms than in other firms. Fama (1980) and Fama...
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  16. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Marissa Mayer Will Make $186 Million on Yahoo’s Sale to Verizon
    www.nytimes.com Ms. Mayer, Yahoo’s chief executive, failed to return the company to greatness but will have a big payday after the sale thanks to her stock, stock options and restricted stock...
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  17. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    fortune.com Companies can reward their CEO's success without giving them outrageously large compensation...
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  18. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Why one share, one vote beats differential share ownership
    boardagenda.com Differential share ownership is a preoccupation with some tech companies but, argues Kerrie Waring, there’s little evidence that it helps in the long...
    Relevant
  19. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Is Tesla's board adequately independent?
    www.professorbainbridge.com NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 provides a number of tests for determining whether directors of a company are independent. Most of them are fairly bright line rules, but there is a key provision that is often overlooked: No director qualifies...
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  20. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Whole Foods Pressured by Activist Investor Jana Partners
    www.nytimes.com The hedge fund criticized the organic food purveyor’s brand development, customer service and distribution strategy, and nominated four candidates for the company’s...
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  21. ProducerJOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Economic consequences of Shareholder Value Maximization (SVM)
    Economic consequences of Shareholder Value Maximization (SVM)Insead has recently published a short article (1) in which they try to draft the economic consequences of the SVM principle first made explicit by Milton Friedman. (2) I will here only made some brief comments on several statements that I...
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  22. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Volkswagen Share Sale Keeps the Automaker a Family Affair
    www.nytimes.com The Porsche family patriarch Ferdinand Piëch is selling most of his stake to relatives rather than to an outside investor who might have demanded...
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  23. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Bombardier juge 'saine' sa politique de rémunération
    www.lesechos.fr Le groupe canadien Bombardier a tenté de justifier ce samedi la forte hausse des rémunérations de sa haute direction, qui a fait l'objet...
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  24. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Jerks and the Start-Ups They Ruin
    www.nytimes.com Bro C.E.O.s like the head of Uber will keep destroying companies until people stop paying...
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    Comments

    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    02/04/2017 #1 JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Language in the article (Opinion section in The New York Times) clearly shows a fierce critic
  25. JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Meet the Shareholders? Not at These Shareholder Meetings
    www.nytimes.com Companies are increasingly turning the annual meeting into an online-only affair, enabling them to cherry-pick questions and squelch dissenting...
    Relevant

    Comments

    JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    01/04/2017 #1 JOAQUIN BARQUERO ESTEVAN
    Technology shouldn`t be used as a tool to limit shareholder rights, among which proposing, asking for information and voting should prevail over technology snobism.
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